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Abstract 
Distributional  implications  of  climate  change  mitigation  policies  are  of  interest  to  social  policy 
scholars because they relate to important questions about fairness: which groups bear the highest 
burdens – or receive the greatest assistance – from these policies and how does this relate to their 
contribution to emissions? It is already well established that general carbon taxes are likely to have 
regressive impacts – placing higher relative burdens on poorer than on richer households – and it is 
often argued that these effects can be reversed, for example through rebate schemes or equal per 
capita carbon allowances. But does this equally hold for all areas of household CO2 emissions such 
as home energy, transport, and total emissions? And which role do household characteristics other 
than income and household size play for the distribution of benefits and burdens from mitigation 
policies?  This  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  mitigation  policies  and  examines  potential 
distributional implications across different emission domains. The analysis is based on a dataset of 
household CO2 emissions that the authors derive from UK expenditure data. It shows that mitigation 
policies that only target home energy emissions are least fair from a distributional point of view, not 
only  in  terms  of  differences  among  income  groups  but  also  in  relation  to  other  household 
characteristics. 
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1  Introduction 
It  is  increasingly  clear  that  radical  policies  to  mitigate  anthropogenic  climate  change  (hereafter 
“mitigation policies”) are urgently required as its impacts are already threatening food security, 
damaging ecological systems and creating new social inequalities, e.g. related to severe weather 
events. Such impacts are set to worsen and contribute to mass migration, resource conflicts and 
other  catastrophic  outcomes  if  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  human  activities  continue  to 
accelerate. An important element of mitigation policies will be to reduce the combustion of fossil 
fuels, and thus the release of carbon dioxide (CO2), the greenhouse gas which contributes the most 
to current warming.  
From a social policy perspective, an important question is how mitigation policies can be 
designed  such  that  unjust  distributional  effects  are,  so  far  as  possible,  avoided.  This  requires 
proportionality in terms of people’s financial capacities to bear burdens of mitigation policies as well 
as in terms of their relative contribution to emissions. Such proportionality is important both from a 
fairness  perspective  and  for  the  public  acceptability  of  such  policies.  Acceptability  is  likely  to 
influence  the  likelihood  that  governments  adopt  them,  as  is  borne  out  by  the  available  policy 
research (Bristow et al., 2010). 
It needs to be emphasised, that any such policies are unlikely to be implemented without a 
new  global  agreement  on  climate  change  mitigation.  The  current  UNFCCC  process  would  only 
implement such an agreement by 2020 at the earliest under the “Doha Gateway” set up at the latest 
COP meeting (Ritter and Casey, 2012). Nonetheless, there are a range of policy instruments which 
could be used to reduce CO2 emissions. Their distributional implications may differ depending on 
their design and the area of emissions that they target.  
Carbon taxes are generally perceived to be regressive – putting larger burdens on poor than 
on rich households relative to their income – because this is a general feature of taxes levied on 
consumption (Johnstone and Serret, 2006; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009). While several previous 
studies (AEA and Cambridge Econometrics, 2008; Boyce and Riddle, 2007; DEFRA, 2008) have shown 
that regressive effects can be reversed through equal per capita carbon trading schemes or schemes 
in  which  revenues  from  mitigation  policies  are  redistributed  to  the  population,  others  have 
questioned the fairness of these schemes (Posner and Weisbach, 2010: ch. 6; Starkey, 2008). In 
particular, they highlighted the possibility that some groups in society might have higher emissions 
due to “structural circumstances” rather than “expensive tastes” (Dworkin, 1981a, b; Starkey, 2012: 
15)
2, e.g. a need for higher indoors temperatures  if someone is feeling the cold more or lives in a 
colder area. From a social policy perspective, this is relevant in several ways: firstly, which household 
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characteristics other than income are important for the responsibility or “need” for emissions? If 
there are groups with higher emission “needs”, would this justify additional support to these groups, 
e.g. in form of infrastructure investment or financial compensation to cope with the cost of emission 
reduction?  We  address  these  questions  by  examining  potential  distributional  implications  of 
mitigation policies, considering a range of household characteristics whilst controlling for income 
and household size. 
Furthermore, little is yet known about how this differs across emission domains as most 
studies that examine distributional implications of mitigation policies for a  several of household 
characteristics usually just focus on one area of emissions or, if emission areas are compared, only 
provide descriptive analysis that does not control for income or other factors (e.g. Brännlund and 
Nordström,  2004;  DEFRA,  2008;  Feng  et  al.,  2010;  Halvorsen,  2009;  Hassett  et  al., 2009; Klinge 
Jacobsen et al., 2003; Labandeira and Labeaga, 1999; White and Thumim, 2009). A comparison of 
emission domains is also important for examining questions such as: how does the regressiveness of 
carbon  taxes  differ  in  direct  comparison?  Can  equal  per  capita  rebates  reverse  regressiveness 
equally for all areas of emissions? By directly comparing potential distributional implications within 
one study, one can be more confident to separate out what is really distinctive about an emissions 
category  as  peculiarities  of  particular  studies  arising  from  differences  in  data  sources  and  time 
periods are avoided. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two will provide a brief overview of mitigation 
policies  and  debates  around  distributional  implications.  Section  three  describes  the  data  and 
methods  applied.  Section  four  examines  and  compares  potential  distributional  implications  of 
different hypothetical mitigation policies. Here the focus lies on a simple £100 per tonne of carbon 
tax scheme and a ‘tax and 100% rebate’ scheme which re-distributes the tax revenue on a per capita 
basis. Section five concludes and discusses limitations. 
 
2  Background: mitigation policies and distributional implications 
In  economic  terms,  climate  change  is  market  failure  caused  by  anthropogenic  greenhouse  gas 
emissions, which are “negative externalities” (costs falling on third parties) arising from production 
and consumption. Hence governance is required to reduce emissions, usually seen as intervention by 
a national government. Here, one can distinguish traditional regulation from economic instruments 
(Helm, 2005). For many commentators, economic instruments are an essential part of policy to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions because they offer increased flexibility and scope, and, hence, 
cost-efficiency  over  a  purely  regulatory,  “command  and  control”  approach.  However,  economic 
instruments  are  sometimes  criticized  because  they  put  a  price  on  a  commons,  the  earth’s 4 
 
atmosphere. That is, they create property rights over what was previously unowned and freely 
accessed by all. Another point of contention is that some rich people will be able to maintain their 
high carbon lifestyles as they are able to pay a higher price for their consumption. However, within 
schemes that set a strict overall cap on emissions this will not be possible for the generality of the 
rich. For the bulk of emission reductions would need to be based on a cut-back of their consumption, 
which is disproportionately responsible for emissions. In short, we acknowledge considerable ethical 
concerns  about,  and  potential  shortcomings  of,  market-based mitigation  policies.  However,  it  is 
plausible that they form a part of any viable plan to avoid dangerous climate change, since emissions 
cannot be regulated away overnight. 
Carbon taxes and cap and trade schemes are the two main classes of economic instruments 
discussed. Both effectively put a price on emissions. In theory, then, both schemes create financial 
incentives to switch to low-impact lifestyles and production methods. The key difference between 
the  two  is  that  environmental  taxes  –  often  termed  ‘Pigouvian  taxes’  –  levy  a  charge  on 
environmentally damaging  activity, whereas cap and trade fixes the amount of  the activity. For 
example, suppose less petrol needs to be sold in order to reduce the emissions its burning causes. A 
tax would be raised on sales, in the expectation that the resulting price increase would reduce 
consumption. The price increase will equal at most the value of the tax. However, it is uncertain how 
consumers respond to the tax: will they substantially reduce their consumption of petrol or will they 
just pay a higher price? The resulting reduction in emissions is thus unknown. In contrast, the cap 
part of cap and trade would limit the annual amount of petrol available to the economy whilst the 
price would depend on the level of consumer demand. 
  Mitigation  instruments  can  apply  at  different  levels  of  economic  activity:  up-,  mid-  or 
downstream in the chain of production running from natural resource extraction down to the end 
user. An upstream scheme would apply a tax or emissions cap to the production and / or import of 
fossil fuels into the economy, thus achieving broadest coverage whilst minimising the number of 
actors included in the scheme and the related administrative costs. Examples are the proposals for 
upstream carbon taxes (Hansen 2009), Cap and Dividend (Barnes 2003), Cap and Share (AEA and 
Cambridge Econometrics 2008; FEASTA 2008) or the Kyoto2 scheme (Tickell 2008). A mid-stream 
scheme would apply to companies outside the primary energy sector producing goods and services. 
The  largest  existing  cap  scheme,  the  European  Union  Emissions  Trading  Scheme  (EU ETS)  is  an 
example, which applies, broadly, to energy using facilities above a certain size. Downstream schemes 
apply to individuals, and in some variants businesses, who would have carbon accounts and trade 
permits themselves (DEFRA 2008a; Fleming 2007). 5 
 
Within  cap  and  trade  schemes,  several  options  exist  as  to  how  emission  permits  are 
allocated  to  the  participants  –  all  of  which  have  different  distributional  impacts.  Initial  Carbon 
budgets can be allocated to the participants in the scheme either free of charge, through auctioning, 
or through a mix. For example, in the European Union Emissions Trading scheme (EU ETS), permits 
have largely been given away for free to companies in the participating sectors, depending on their 
previous  and  estimated  future  emissions.  This  approach  is  called  ‘grandfathering’.  It  is  widely 
believed that this leads to windfall profits for companies as they will pass the opportunity cost of 
using a permit onto customers, or sell a considerable volume of their allocated permits. In other 
words, grandfathering is likely to have regressive effects (Shammin and Bullard 2009; Sijm et al. 
2006). In contrast, auctioning the permits makes the polluters pay whilst the distributional effects 
depend on the capabilities of the targeted industries to pass on the costs and the availability of 
alternatives  to  these  goods  for  consumers.  Furthermore,  auctioning  emission  permits  to  the 
participants creates a revenue stream for the government or organisation that issues the permits. 
We  will  discuss  below  how  those  revenues  can  be  used  to  counter-balance  possible  regressive 
effects of mitigation policies. 
 
2.1 Distributional implications 
Regressivity is a general feature of taxes on consumption, and therefore one would expect carbon 
taxes  to  be  regressive.  This  expectation  also  carries  through  to  various  types  of  cap  and  trade 
schemes. Overall, the literature on the distributional effects of mitigation policies confirms this prior 
view (Dresner and Ekins 2006; Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Parry 2004; Serret and Johnstone 2006, 
to name but a few). However, there are exceptions to this rule depending on the source of pollution 
that is targeted and how the revenue arising from the policy is used. We will review results from 
previous studies on carbon taxes, before discussing the ways in which revenue from mitigation 
policies can be used and their distributional implications.  
There is a general consensus that taxes on home energy use are regressive if the revenue 
from those taxes or charges is not redistributed to the citizens (Baranzini, et al. 2000; Barker and 
Köhler 1998; Dresner and Ekins 2006). The effects of such taxes, covering electricity and heating 
fuels, are particularly regressive because home energy use is relatively evenly distributed across 
income deciles (at least in industrialised countries) as shown below in the results section.  This 
means that low income households spend much higher shares of their income on home energy than 
richer households (Dresner and Ekins 2006; Druckman and Jackson 2008; Wier et al. 2005). 
Schemes which put a price on carbon emissions further upstream, for example through a tax 
on total carbon emissions or a cap and trade scheme that applies only to those who introduce fossil 6 
 
fuels into the market, have an effect not only on downstream energy prices but also on all other 
goods and services due to the higher price of the energy used in their production. Since overall 
expenditure including consumer goods generally increases less than proportionally with income (see, 
for example, ONS (2009), table A9, for the UK case), upstream mitigation policies are therefore likely 
to have additional regressive effects. These will be substantial because indirect emissions comprise 
around  half  of  UK  households’  overall  emissions  (52.9  per  cent  in  our  study)  However,  a 
complication  is  that  upstream  mitigation  policies  will  have  weaker  regressive  effects  than 
downstream policies if companies that are affected by the upstream policies are not able to fully 
pass on the costs of the tax to customers (e.g. Baranzini et al., 2000; Wier et al., 2005).  
The results are more varied when it comes to carbon taxes on transport or motor fuels. 
Several studies state that motor fuel taxes place higher burdens on middle income households than 
on poor or rich households (Blow and Crawford, 1997; Poterba, 1990). For the UK, Dresner and Ekins 
(2004) found that taxes on motor fuels or vehicles have progressive effects for the whole population 
but regressive effects amongst motorists; (see also Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003; Tiezzi, 2005)). 
  Some studies compare the distributional effects of energy or mitigation policies for different 
domains such as home energy and transport. These find that taxes on home energy emissions are 
more  regressively  distributed  than  taxes  on  transport  emissions.  However,  they  often  only 
concentrate  on  distribution  over  income.  For  example,  Barker  and  Köhler  (1998:  398)  provide 
regressivity ratios separately for taxes on home energy, petrol and total CO2 emissions for 11 EU 
countries including the UK; Hassett and Mathur (2009) examine the distribution of tax burdens over 
income groups separately for CO2 taxes on direct and indirect emissions in the United States; and 
Wier et al. (2005) compare the distribution of burdens from an upstream CO2 tax to one on direct 
energy only over income groups for Denmark but none of these studies considers other household 
characteristcs. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2003) compare impacts of a motor fuel and home energy tax 
for Denmark using Gini coefficients and distributions over different household groups but without 
controlling for income. 
  The literature summarised above shows that if the revenue from carbon taxes or carbon 
trading  schemes  are  not earmarked  for  redistribution  to  citizens,  they  are  highly  likely  to  have 
regressive effects, with the possible exception of schemes that only include transport emissions. But 
the distributional outcomes of mitigation policies crucially depend on how the revenues are used 
and distributed. Revenues arise, for example, through carbon taxes or if emission permits within 
trading schemes are (partly) auctioned. Three options for redistributing revenues are salient in the 
literature, though such options could also be combined in different proportions.  7 
 
1)   The revenue can be used to finance measures that further reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
support behavioural adaptation, as proposed by Tickell (2008). For example energy efficiency 
measures through home insulation programmes, investments into renewable energy or public 
transport subsidies, training and R&D can be supported. The distributional effects depend on 
who  is  benefiting  from  those  programs.  For  example,  means  tested  home  insulation 
programmes like the Warm Front programme in the UK benefit low income households, and 
subsidies  for  public  transport  currently  primarily  benefit  low  income  urban  households. 
Policies that aim to expand renewable energy, in contrast, can have regressive effects if they 
work through financial incentives to (already wealthy) homeowners (e.g. see Monbiot, 2010 
on the distributional implications of the feed-in tariffs for solar electricity). 
2)   The  revenue  from  taxes  or  auctions  under  cap  and  trade  schemes  can  be  partly  or  fully 
redistributed to the population and / or industry by reducing other existing taxes. This is 
frequently  discussed  in  the  environmental  economics  literature  as  the  ‘double  dividend’ 
hypothesis of ‘green taxes’. This is the proposition that environmental taxes generate dual 
benefits. Whilst the tax creates incentives to reduce the activities which give rise to negative 
externalities, that is, the revenue generated can be ‘recycled’ for any other purpose, including 
the reduction of taxes on income or capital, which are often held to discourage economic 
activity, or VAT which is regressive. If we return to our example on petrol, the tax would not 
only set an incentive for customers to buy less petrol, but the raised revenue could be used to 
offset other tax burdens, for example income tax. From a mainstream economics perspective, 
this would limit market distortions that those taxes might imply, for example reduced work 
incentives. If the entire revenue is earmarked to decrease/remove other taxes, the tax reform 
is  termed  ‘revenue  neutral’,  meaning  that  the  costs  of  the  new  source  of  revenue  are 
completely  compensated  through  the  reduction  of  other  taxes  or  charges.  However,  one 
problem with the “double dividend” hypothesis is that the revenue from green taxes should 
decline over time if the tax incentive is working, e.g. if carbon emissions are reduced. If this is 
the case, total government revenue would be shrinking, creating a need to increase other 
types of taxes. 
    Studies on the effects of reducing social security contributions, taxes on income, or 
VAT  so  far  show  mixed  results,  demonstrating  that  distributional  implications  of  such 
measures cannot be generalised but depend on the specifics of the existing tax and benefit 
system and “double dividend” reforms introduced. For example, a study on the German “eco 
tax”  demonstrated  that  the  reduction  of  the  contribution  to  pension  insurance  increased 
previous regressive effects as the reduction mainly benefited middle income households but 8 
 
disadvantaged low income, unemployed and pensioner households (Bach et al., 2002; Bork, 
2006). Conversely, studies on the reduction of income tax report progressive effects if taxes on 
low incomes are reduced more than those on higher incomes (e.g. Grainger and Kolstad, 2008; 
Metcalf, 1999; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009). Labandeira et al.’s (2009) study of a revenue-
neutral reduction of VAT as a compensating mechanism also showed progressive effects. A 
second option is for the revenue to be returned to citizens by increasing specific social security 
benefits, for example, child benefit or means-tested benefits such as tax credits or income 
support. With this option, regressive effects can be considerably reduced or even reversed as 
several studies have demonstrated (Baranzini et al., 2000; Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Ekins and 
Barker, 2001; Ekins and Dresner, 2004). 
3)   A  final  option  is  to  return  the  revenue  from  mitigation  policies  directly  to  individuals  or 
households as a lump sum. There is a substantial literature discussing this option (Barker and 
Köhler, 1998; CEC, 1992; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Ekins and Barker, 2001; Parry, 2004; West 
and Williams, 2002). In the United States, a ‘carbon tax and 100% dividend’ proposal has 
recently been promoted by climate scientist James Hansen (2009). An equal per capita rebate 
or free allocation of emission permits (which is distributionally equivalent) is also integral to 
Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) (DEFRA, 2008), Cap and Share and Cap and Dividend proposals 
(Barnes, 2003; FEASTA, 2008). Under PCT, individuals receive equal per capita tradable carbon 
allowances.  Under  Cap  and  Dividend,  an  independent  climate  trust would  auction  off  the 
permits to  upstream  fossil  fuels  producers or  importers  and  redistribute equal  per  capita 
rebates to the citizens. Under Cap and Share, an independent trust would allocate each citizen 
with an equal share of the nation’s emission permits which they can then sell via banks or post 
offices. Fossil fuel producers or importers would have to buy the permits to cover the carbon 
content of the products that they intend to sell on the market. 
 
Studies which examined the distributional effects of equal per capita permit or rebate schemes 
usually conclude that this option has strongly progressive effects on average when applied to total 
or direct emissions (AEA and Cambridge Econometrics, 2008; Barker and Köhler, 1998; DEFRA, 2008; 
Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Parry, 2004; Starkey and Anderson, 2005). This means that low income 
households will gain more (lose less) as a share of their income than high income households. For 
example, in a Cap and Share or Cap and Dividend scheme, any individual who consumes less than 
the capped level of emissions will financially gain from the rebate/revenue (AEA and Cambridge 
Econometrics, 2008; Boyce and Riddle, 2007). As low income households usually generate relatively 
low  emissions,  they  may gain  financially  from  the scheme. Even  if  gains  were equal  across  the 9 
 
income distribution, they would be larger as a share of income for poorer than for richer households. 
If poorer households gain more in absolute terms than richer households, the distributional effect 
will be strongly progressive in relative terms.
3 However, questions have been raised regarding the 
fairness of equal per capita schemes as they are not taking higher “needs” for emissions that some 
people in society may have into account (e.g. Posner and Weisbach, 2010: ch. 6; Starkey, 2008; 
Starkey, 2012). Whilst a discussion about a distinction between needs and wants when it comes to 
emissions  goes  beyond  this  chapter,  our  analysis  of  relationships  between  a  whole  range  of 
household characteristics and emissions will help identify potential groups with higher emission 
needs which may need to be addressed through complementary policies. 
  Furthermore, the studies outlined above estimate effects of mitigation policies either within 
a  single  area  or  for  total  emissions.  There  are  no  studies  we  are  aware  of  that  compare  the 
distributional implications, taking a range of household characteristics into account, of per capita 
rebate schemes for different areas of emissions. Do equal per capita schemes reverse regressiveness 
in all areas? What are potential implications for different types of households arising from equal per 
capita schemes related to different areas of emissions? We will examine this question below. 
 
3  Data and limitations 
3.1 Data 
For  the  UK  there  is  currently  no  representative  CO2  emissions  dataset  at  the  household  level 
available. Research on the distribution of emissions across households thus relies on other data 
sources to estimate household emissions. In this paper, we convert rich information on households’ 
expenditure into CO2 estimates. Our household expenditure data derive from the UK Living Costs 
and Food Survey (LCF) for the years 2008 and 2009 and its predecessor, the Expenditure and Food 
Survey (EFS), for the years 2006 and 2007 which, merged, provide us with a total household sample 
size of 24,446. The LCF/EFS is an annual survey, covering detailed information on expenditure for a 
large  number  of  consumer  items  and  services  according  to  the  UN  Classification  of  Individual 
Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) and a range of socio-economic variables. We convert 
households’ expenditure into CO2 emission estimates using the following methods.  
                                                           
3 The distributional effects of lump-sum rebate schemes also depend on the level of the cap. PCT or Cap and 
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scheme, its distributional effects are likely to be regressive in highly developed countries. For example, a global scheme 
which allocated a budget of 4 tonnes of CO2 per year to each citizen in 2006, slightly below the then world average of 4.39 
tonnes CO2 per person, would have regressive effects in most industrialised countries as their average per capita emissions 
are much higher (in the UK, annual per capita emissions were 9.37 tonnes CO2, in the US 19 tonnes CO2 in 2006, according 
to the World Bank Development Indicators.). However, those schemes would be extremely progressive in less developed 
countries. See Wakeford (2008) and Sharan (2008) on the impact of a Cap and Share scheme on South Africa and India 
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For home energy we use Tables 2.2.3 and 2.3.3 of the Quarterly Energy Prices statistics by 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2011a, b) providing us with information on 
annual domestic electricity and gas prices per kWh, including standing charge and VAT, for three 
payment methods and each electricity/gas region. Since the LCF/EFS include variables on payment 
method and region, we can estimate units of energy consumption separately for piped gas and 
electricity. In addition, our home energy CO2 estimates include emissions from heating oil, bottled 
gas, coal and wood which comprise 9.8 per cent of the UK households’ CO2 home energy emissions 
estimate. Here we use Sutherland (2012) tables to convert expenditure into units of consumption. 
For transport CO2 emissions we estimate litres of motor fuel (petrol and diesel) consumed 
using AA statistics (AA, 2006-2009) of monthly motor fuel prices for each government region. For 
public  transport  we  estimate  kilometres  travelled  employing  information  on  average  annual 
passenger miles for train, tube, bus and coach journeys from the National Travel Survey for Great 
Britain  (DfT, 2011: table NTS0305)  and  the  Northern  Ireland Travel  Survey  for  Northern  Ireland 
(DRDNI, 2011: table 3.1). Flight emissions are estimated by approximating flight kilometres merging 
information from the LCF/EFS survey on the number of person flights per household within the UK, 
Europe and outside Europe with average mileage for flights to these destinations calculated using 
the NTS and the International Passenger Survey.  
DECC  CO2  conversion  factors  (DECC  and  DEFRA,  2011)  provided  for  different  fuels  and 
modes of transport are then applied to units of consumption of home energy, litres of motor fuels 
and kilometres travelled by mode of transport to estimate CO2 emissions.  
To estimate indirect emissions we use the Resources and Energy Analysis Programme (REAP) 
database  which  provides  estimates  of  total  CO2  emissions  arising  from  consumption  by  UK 
households of 56 COICOP categories in 2006 (Paul et al., 2010). These data are used to generate CO2 
per  pound  expenditure  factors  for  50  consumption  categories  which  we  apply  to  household 
expenditure to estimate emissions. Expenditure data for 2007-9 are deflated to 2006 prices using 
Consumer Price Index Statistics for each of the consumption categories. For further details see Büchs 
and Schnepf (2013, forthcoming). 
 
3.2 Limitations 
Estimating emissions based on household expenditure is limited in several ways. Firstly, the data 
available to us in the LCF/EFS and external statistics cannot account for some of the heterogeneity of 
emissions in the “real world”. For example, neither the LCF/EFS or the DECC home energy price 
statistics provide information on the tariff that a household is subscribed to; for public transport 
tickets and flights the provider of the service and type of ticket (first or second class or reductions for 11 
 
pre-booking or railcards) are unknown; and for other consumer items we have no information on 
brands. This might also lead to a slight overestimation of emissions by rich people because they 
might, on average, purchase more expensive products even though the actual product has similar or 
even lower emissions (e.g. local organic produce from the farmers market compared to that from a 
supermarket, shipped round the world and cooled over long periods) (Girod and De Haan, 2010).  
Another  limitation  results  from  the  ‘infrequency  of  purchase  problem’.  The  LCF  collects 
expenditure data through a survey covering quarterly or annual expenditure for more infrequent 
purchases such as electricity and gas bills, cars, season tickets and package holidays. However, some 
more  frequent  expenditure  items  are  only  collected  through  two-week  diaries  kept  by  each 
household member. For all these expenditures, expenditure estimates might be affected by the 
‘infrequency of purchase’ problem. For some items we can estimate the extent of the problem, for 
example, we know that only 1.2% of households have an expenditure on flights, whilst 41% of 
households state in the survey that they had at least one flight in the past 12 months (consequently, 
we use the survey, not the expenditure data, to estimate flight emissions). Furthermore, we know 
that 18.2% of households with a vehicle have not purchased any petrol during the diary window 
whilst data from the National Travel Survey indicate that only around 0.1% of households with a 
vehicle have not driven their car within the last year.  
For our CO2 transport estimate this problem most clearly affects motor fuels and public 
transport which contribute 74.3 per cent of our total transport CO2 estimate (the rest deriving from 
flights for which we use the survey measure) and 16.2 per cent of our total CO2 UK estimate. For 
home energy the problem is less relevant with heating fuels collected through the diary such as oil, 
bottled gas, coal, wood and peat contributing only 2.6 per cent to total emissions and prepayment 
electricity only used by 15.0 and gas pre-payments by 12.2 per cent of households with access to 
mains  gas.  All  indirect  CO2  emission  estimates  are  based  on  diary  data.  Whilst  proportions  of 
households with zero expenditure can be high for individual categories, none of the households has 
zero expenditure on items that are included in indirect emissions (see Table 1). 
Does the infrequency of purchase problem affect our analysis? All previous studies using 
expenditure data for estimating CO2 emissions implicitly or explicitly (DEFRA, 2008: 13) assume that 
CO2 estimates based on diary data provide unbiased estimates of population mean values, as zero 
expenditure from infrequently purchased items should be compensated by expenditures higher than 
the actual consumption rate of those households who stock up during the diary period. However, 
measures of dispersion and inequality such as standard deviation and Gini coefficients are likely to 
be overestimated. For this reason, we use ratios of mean emissions comparing different income 
quintiles  rather  than  the  gini  coefficient  for  examining  emissions  inequality  and  distributional 12 
 
implications of mitigation policies. In the last section, we present OLS regression results. Since the 
measurement error relates to the dependent variable, we need to be aware that standard errors of 
coefficients are likely to be inflated.  
 
4  Results 
4.1  CO2 emissions in the UK by emission area 
Table 1 shows mean and median household CO2 emissions for our pooled sample. Median UK total 
household emissions are 17.1 tonnes of CO2 emission per year whilst the mean is as high as 20.2 
tonnes, demonstrating a positively skewed distribution. Home energy emissions constitute 25 per 
cent of total emissions. 22 per cent of total household emissions originate from transport, including 
flight emissions that contribute as much as 6 per cent on average to households’ total emissions 
(equating to only 0.6 private flights per person per year or 1.3 flights per household). The remaining 
53 per cent consist of indirect emissions incorporated in other goods and services.   
 
4.2   Inequality of emissions 
We know from previous research that emissions are unequally distributed across UK households 
(see review above) but how does this compare for different areas of emissions? Table 2 shows 
measures of variation and inequality for home energy, transport, indirect and total emissions. The 
coefficient of variation (CV), which is a standardised measure of the dispersion of a variable around 
the mean, shows that total, home energy and indirect emissions show similar levels of dispersion 
with CVs of 61.8, 63.5 and 66.8 respectively, whilst transport emissions vary more around the mean, 
particularly if ‘zero’ emissions are included, with a CV of 102.2. However, since the coefficient of 
variation is sensitive to the infrequency of purchase problem, it is likely to be inflated, particularly 
for  transport  emissions.  Column 4  shows mean emissions  for  households  in the  lowest  income 
quintile which can be compared with mean emissions for households in the highest income quintile 
in column 5. Since sample sizes are fairly large with almost 4,900 households per quintile we can 
assume that these mean figures are not substantially influenced by infrequency of purchase. Column 
6 shows the ratio of mean emissions for the highest and lowest income quintiles, demonstrating that 
transport emissions are most unequally and home energy emissions most equally distributed. 
Figures  1  and  2  graph  the  distribution  of  emissions  over  equivalised  income  deciles, 
confirming that emissions in all areas are unequally distributed and rise with rising income, but 
mostly so for transport emissions. The 25% of households with the lowest incomes only emit 11 per 
cent of all transport emissions, 14 per cent of indirect and 15 per cent of total emissions, whilst the 
richest emit 42, 38 and 37 per cent respectively. However, for home energy, the poorest 25% emit 13 
 
20%  of  all  emissions,  whilst  the  richest  25%  emit  30%.  These  inequalities  illustrate  the  vast 
contribution that rich households make to overall emissions: If all households restricted themselves 
to CO2 emissions equal to those of the poorest 25 per cent, average UK household emissions would 
decrease from 20.2 to about 12.1 tonnes and total annual UK household emissions from 513 to 306 
million tonnes. If achieved by 2020 and compared to a baseline of 586 million tonnes in 1990 (DECC, 
2012), this would equate to a reduction by 48 per cent to the 1990 baseline - much more drastic 
than the currently envisaged reduction of 20 per cent by 2020 that the European Union subscribed 
to. Again, this relates back to policy implications of carbon reduction policies, highlighting issues 
around fairness if low income households are penalised. 
 
4.3   Distributional implications of mitigation policies 
To  examine  potential  distributional  implications,  we  first  calculated  the  tax  burden  from  a 
hypothetical tax of £100 per one tonne of carbon dioxide emission. The tax burden is expressed as a 
proportion of equivalised household income. Figure 2 suggests that taxes are regressively distributed 
for all emission domains, apart from transport where they appear to be near neutral. Households in 
the lowest equivalised income decile would lose 5.6 per cent of their income from taxes on home 
energy,  7.6  for  indirect,  2.0  for  transport  and  15.3  per  cent  for  taxes  on  total  emissions.  This 
compares to 1.1 per cent, 2.9 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 5.3 per cent respectively for households in 
the highest equivalised income decile.  
As discussed above, it is assumed in the literature that the regressiveness of carbon taxes 
can be reversed, for example by redistributing the tax revenue to the population on a per capita 
basis. To estimate distributional implications we estimate “net rebates” as a proportion of annual 
disposable income per household. This is achieved by substracting the tax burden from the rebates 
that each household received (based on the number of adults or adults and children in a household) 
and expressing this as a proportion of disposable household income. The net rebates have a mean of 
zero. Figure 3 shows the estimated distributional outcome of such as scheme and suggests that 
regressive effects can indeed be reversed for total, indirect and transport emissions whilst income 
effect seem very marginal for home energy emissions across the income distribution.  
This can be examined further using the Suits index for tax progressivity which compares the 
cumulative distribution of the tax burden to the cumulative income distribution (Suits, 1977). Since 
the Suits index can be calculated based on mean emissions and mean income per income decile, it is 
less affected by the infrequency of purchase problem than the Gini coefficient that is sometimes 
used to examine changes in income inequality before and after a tax or benefit reform. The Suits 
index reaches from -1 (extreme regressivity) to +1 (extreme progressivity). Results are presented in 14 
 
table 3: The Suits index confirms that taxes on home energy have most regressive effects, followed 
by taxes on total emissions. Conversely, taxes on transport emissions are near neutrally distributed 
or even progressive for flight emissions. The remainder of the table presents the change of the 
income ratio comparing the highest and lowest income quintiles after different mitigation policies 
are applied, including the £100 carbon tax, an equal per adult tax and rebate (T&R) scheme and an 
equal per adult T&R scheme that also includes half a rebate per child. Positive figures indicate that 
income inequality rises after the policy is applied and vice versa. To achieve comparability, the 
changes  in  income  ratios  are  scaled  up  based  on  the  proportion  that  they  contribute  to  total 
emissions in the right-hand side of the table (e.g. since home energy emissions constitute 25 per 
cent of total emissions, the ratio change is scaled up by a factor of 4). 
Results  suggest  that  T&R  schemes  on  home  energy  reduce  income  inequality  only  very 
marginally whilst those applied to transport emissions have stronger progressive effects. This is an 
interesting result as it may question the effectiveness of equal per capita home energy allowances 
(DEFRA, 2008; Parry and Williams, 2010). Furthermore, the scheme that includes allowances for 
children suggests stronger progressive effects across all emission domains than the scheme that only 
distributes rebates to adults.  
  Most of the existing work on distributional implications of mitigation policies focusses on 
income. However, household characteristics other than income may well play an important role in 
influencing  distributional  outcomes  of  mitigation  policies,  including  age,  employment  status, 
education  and  rural/urban  location.  To  examine  the  relationship  between  other  household 
characteristics and distributional impacts, we estimated mean net rebates from a £100 per tonne of 
CO2 adult-only T&R scheme and tested whether means differ for specific groups (see table 4). First, 
the different role of household size for different areas of emissions becomes evident: whilst two-
adult  households  lose  significantly  more  from  adult-only  T&R  schemes  on  total  and  transport 
emissions than one-adult households, the opposite is true for home energy. However, economies of 
scale also become relevant for total and transport emissions for households with three or more 
adults.  Households  with  children  also  receive  significantly  lower  net  rebates  than  households 
without children who ‘gain’ on average for all schemes. This pattern reverses if the scheme allocates 
each child half of the lump sum rebate (results not shown).  
  The results also show an interesting relationship between age and distributional outcomes. 
Previous research has shown that the relationship between age and emissions takes on an inverse u-
shape, apart from home energy emissions which still rise with high age (Buchs and Schnepf, 2013). 
This  is  confirmed when we  compare  mean  net  rebates: on  average,  households with reference 
persons aged 35-65 receive significantly lower rebates, and those with reference persons aged 65+ 15 
 
significantly higher ones, compared to households with reference persons under 35. In contrast, the 
oldest age group ‘loses’ more than the other two groups for home energy schemes. Education also 
makes  a  difference  to  the  financial  implications  of  this  scheme:  Those  with  highly  educated 
reference  persons  (defined  as  attending  full-time  education  for  16  or  more  years)  receive 
significantly lower net rebates than households in which no-one attended full time education for 
more than 11 years.  
  Rural households (defined as those in settlements of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants) receive 
lower net rebates than ‘urban’ households (households in all other areas), apart from schemes that 
apply  to  flights  and  public  transport  only,  when  there  is  no  significant  difference.  Workless 
households (defined as households with at least one person of working age but without any working 
age person in employment) receive significantly higher net rebates than households in which at least 
one person of working age is in employment. Female headed households receive significantly higher 
net rebates than male headed households for schemes that apply to total and transport emissions, 
but lower rebates for schemes that apply to home energy emissions. Whilst households with ‘non-
white’ reference persons receive significantly higher rebates than other households in most cases, 
they ‘lose’ out from schemes that only apply to flights. Finally, whilst poor rural households with 
vehicles ‘lose’ on average from T&R schemes that apply to motor fuels and home energy, they ‘lose’ 
significantly less than rich rural households with vehicles and they ‘gain’ from all other schemes.  
  Even  though  some  groups  are  estimated  to  ‘gain’  on  average  from  T&R  schemes  as 
demonstrated above, a certain proportion of households with these characteristics will still ‘lose’ 
from these schemes as they emit more than the rebate that they are allocated. Table 5 provides an 
overview of the estimated proportion of households in each group ‘losing’ from an adult-only T&R 
scheme across the different emission domains. This confirms that, on average, considerably lower 
proportions  of  low  income,  older,  childless,  female  headed  low  educated,  urban  and  workless 
households  ‘lose’  from  these  schemes  than  their  counterparts.  However,  the  proportion  of 
households ‘losing’ from these schemes can still be considerable, for example, amongst low income 
households 21.1 per cent are estimated to ‘lose’ from a scheme on total emissions, 42.5 per cent in 
relation to a home energy emissions scheme 18.7 per cent within a scheme targeting motor fuels. 
Furthermore, there are some exceptions to the general pattern that higher proportions of well-
situated households ‘lose’ from T&R schemes, particularly for schemes on home energy emissions 
for  which  higher  proportions  (around  half)  of  households  with  older  reference  persons,  female 
headed households and ‘low educated’ households ‘lose’ than their counterparts. 
   16 
 
  Clearly, many of these household characteristics are related, such as high income and high 
education  or  rural  location  and  car  ownership.  Which  characteristics  still  make  a  significant 
difference to households’ estimated net rebates from a T&R scheme after income and other factors 
are held constant can be examined applying multivariate regression analysis. In the remainder of this 
chapter we present results from OLS regression of net rebates from a £100 per tonne T&R adult-only 
scheme on total, home energy and transport.
4  
The first  three columns show models that only include income  and household size as 
independent variables, columns 4 to 6 present models that include a range of other household 
characteristics and columns 7 and 8 show results for total and home energy emissions, also 
controlling for type of dwelling and heating type.  Missings are excluded in all models to make the 
results comparable. Robust standard errors to address heteroskedasticity as well as sampling 
weights are applied in all four models.  Error terms were not perfectly normally distributed but 
results were robust against exclusion of regression error outliers without significant changes in 
coefficients. The models presented here include regression outliers. 
The results confirm that an increase in income is related to ‘losses’ from a T&R scheme (here 
measured  as  annual  disposable  income  divided  by  10,000).  A  comparison  of  results  after 
standardizing the values of the dependent variables confirmed  that effect sizes are greatest for 
schemes on total emissions and lowest for home energy (results not shown). Results in table 6 also 
show that each additional adult in the household is associated with further ‘gains’ from and adult-
only T&R scheme whilst additional children tend to be associated with ‘losses’ from these schemes 
compared to households without children. If children receive half an allowance each, each additional 
child is associated with a significantly higher allowance compared to households without children 
even after controlling for other factors (regression results for these models not shown).
5  
Interestingly,  high  education  remains  associated  with  significant  ‘losses’  (compared  to 
households in which none of the members attended full time education for more than 11 years) 
from T&R schemes across all emission domains even after controlling for income and other factors.  
Female headed households ‘lose’ significantly more from schemes on total and home energy 
emissions than male headed households. Workless households tend to ‘win’ from schemes on total 
and transport emissions compared to households in employment but do not significantly differ from 
their counterparts in relation to home energy schemes.  
                                                           
4 The net rebate variables are divided by 1000 to rescale coefficient sizes. The 1
st and 99
th percentile of the net rebate and 
income distribution are excluded from the regression analysis to minimise the influence of outliers. 
5 All other patterns described above remain very similar in the model which allocates half an allowance to every child, 
apart from ethnic minority households’ rebates on transport emissions which are no longer significantly different to ‘white’ 
households, probably related to the significantly higher number of children in ethnic minority households (1 child on 
average (se 0.03) compared to 0.5 (se 0.01) for “white” households).  17 
 
Rural households ‘lose’ from all types of T&R schemes, suggesting that they use more energy 
for heating their homes and for travelling than urban households even after controlling for income, 
education, housing and vehicle ownership. However, rural location is no longer significant in the full 
model that also controls for dwelling and heating type as well as home ownership. This suggests that 
higher home energy emissions of rural households are largely accounted for by a higher proportion 
of detached houses and oil central heating. As one would expect, additional numbers of bedrooms 
and owning a car ‘reduce’ rebates from T&R schemes on all types of emissions because they relate 
to higher emissions from home energy and transport. The ‘full’ model of rebates on total and home 
energy emissions also indicates that owning an accommodation outright or through a mortgage 
‘reduces’ the rebate compared to households who are renting.  
5  Conclusion and Discussion 
Comparing estimated distributions of burdens from carbon taxes and net rebates from T&R schemes 
across emission domains in the UK provides several insights. According to income ratios, transport 
emissions were most unequally distributed in the sample, followed by indirect, total and home 
energy emissions. We also found that carbon taxes on transport are less regressive than taxes on 
total or home energy emissions, confirming findings from other studies (e.g. Barker and Köhler, 1998; 
Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003). Taxes on flight emissions were slightly progressive based on the Suits 
index and near neutral using changes in income ratios whilst taxes on motor fuels remained to be 
more regressive. This contrasts to findings by Barker and Köhler (1998: 398) and Dresner and Ekins 
(2004) who found taxes on motor fuels to be neutral or progressive in the UK. This may well be 
because car ownership amongst low income households was much lower in the mid to late 1990s. In 
1995  NTS  data  record  just  under  40%  of  sampled households  in  the  lowest  income  quintile  as 
owning cars, but by 2008 this had risen to 60% (Stokes and Lucas, 2011). In our data, by 2009 car 
ownership was an estimated 48% in the lowest income decile. 
Our  results  also  confirm  that  T&R  schemes,  generally  speaking,  have  progressive 
distributional effects, based on a comparison of income inequality before and after applying the T&R 
schemes. However, this was less clear for the home energy scheme which was surprising given that 
per capita schemes  have been advocated for reversing regressive effects of home energy taxes 
(DEFRA,  2008;  Parry  and  Williams,  2010).  T&R  schemes  on  total  and  transport  emissions  also 
appeared to be slightly more progressive if allowances for children were included.  
Furthermore, employing multivariate analysis suggests that household characteristics other 
than  income  and  household  size  have  important,  independent  associations  with  distributional 
outcomes and may thus need to be considered in the design of mitigation or other complementary 
policies as they may indicate greater emissions “needs” or responsibilities for emissions – including 18 
 
rural location, type of heating and dwelling, age, worklessness, gender and high education. This add 
weight to the point so far most forcefully raised by Starkey (2008;  2012) that equal per capita 
allowances or rebates may not be fair as they do not take these responsibilities and/or “needs” into 
account. Whilst per capita schemes are perhaps least costly from an administrative point of view, 
they may need to be complemented by additional schemes that offer compensation to people who 
have higher emissions due to circumstances beyond their own choice. 
 
Due to several limitations, results presented in this chapter need to be treated with caution:  
  Distributional implications across emission domains are compared by applying the same tax 
rate in each area. If the degree of regressiveness or progressiveness is compared across 
emission domains, results might differ if different tax rates are applied to different areas.  
  We only applied a very simple method of simulating distributional outcomes by focussing on 
the change in household income after the tax or T&R scheme is applied. More  detailed 
simulation exercises would also introduce the complexities of the existing tax and benefit 
system and could examine how changes based on mitigation policies interact with other 
changes in the tax and benefit system.  
  In relation to T&R schemes we referred to ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ from these schemes. However, 
if a declining upstream cap on emissions was set (which is necessary if emission reduction 
targets are to be met), financial ‘gains’ from these schemes would not translate into overall 
higher consumption or increases in material living standards. This is because the economy 
would be shrinking overall to the extent that alternative energy sources and efficiency gains 
are not fully substituting for fossil energy. Monetary income from the scheme might not be 
falling because of the increased scarcity value of fossil fuels, but money is, ultimately, only a 
claim on goods and services produced. The limitation of our analysis here is intrinsic to static 
microsimulation, which allows a detailed analysis of instantaneous effects at the cost of 
assuming unchanged behaviour.  
  Due to the infrequency of purchase problem outlined above, some measures of distribution 
or inequality are likely to be inflated, particularly for transport related emissions.  
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Table 1: Mean and median annual household CO2 emissions in tonnes, per cent of total emission and per 
cent of households not having emissions by emission area 
  
Median 
CO2, 
tonnes 
Mean 
CO2, 
tonnes 
Standard 
error 
mean, 
tonnes 
Per cent 
of total 
CO2 
emissions 
Per cent of 
households 
without 
emissions 
Home energy total of which  4.48  5.11  0.03  25.3  5.7 
Gas  2.35  2.49  0.02  12.3  22.8 
Electricity  1.84  2.09  0.01  10.4  8.1 
Other home energy  0.00  0.53  0.03  2.6  93.2 
  
         
Transport total of which  2.97  4.40  0.04  21.8  15.2 
Motor fuels  1.60  2.38  0.03  11.8  36.4 
Flights  0.00  1.13  0.02  5.6  59.0 
Public transport  0.00  0.89  0.02  4.4  50.2 
  
         
Indirect total of which  8.69  10.67  0.08  52.9  0.0 
Indirect home energy and 
motor fuel emissions 
2.23  2.60  0.02  12.9  9.0 
Food  1.33  1.53  0.01  7.6  0.7 
Catering/hotels  0.69  1.11  0.01  5.5  11.6 
Cars & repairs  0.05  0.4  0.01  2.0  39.5 
Recreation  0.33  0.77  0.03  3.8  3.7 
Clothing  0.23  0.66  0.01  3.3  32.6 
Furniture, appliances, tools  0.13  0.67  0.01  3.3  32.1 
Personal care  0.17  0.38  0.01  1.9  12.3 
Other indirect  1.53  2.54  0.03  12.6  0.0 
  
         
Total  17.13  20.18  0.13  100.0  0.0 
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Table 2: CO2 emissions and inequality 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  Mean  Median  CV  Mean 
CO2 low 
income 
Mean 
CO2 
high 
income 
20/80 
ratio  
Total  20.18  17.13  72.42  11.47  30.94  2.70 
Indirect  10.67  8.69  86.69  5.79  16.84  2.91 
Home 
energy 
5.11  4.48  77.97  3.97  6.32  1.59 
Transport  4.40  2.97  113.21  1.70  7.79  4.57 
Note: CV stands for coefficient of variation. Column 4 shows mean emissions for the lowest income quintile, 
based on equivalised income. Colum 5 shows mean emissions for the highest income quintile. Column 6 shows 
the ratio of mean emissions of the top and bottom income quintiles. 
 
 21 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of annual household emissions over equivalised income deciles 
 
Note: Sample size 24,446 
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Figure 2: The distribution of annual CO2 tax burdens over equivalised income deciles 
 
Note: The 1
st and 99
th percentile of the income distribution are excluded to reduce bias from income outliers. 
The tax burden relates to carbon taxes of £100 per tonne, expressed as per cent of annual disposable 
household income. 
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Figure 3: the distribution of net allowances from a carbon tax and rebate scheme, per cent of disposable 
income 
 
Note: the 1
st and 99
th percentiles of the income distribution are excluded to minimise bias from income 
outliers. The net rebates are calculated by subtracting the CO2 tax to be paid by each household from their 
equal per adult allocation of tax rebates. The net rebate is expressed as per cent of annual disposable 
household income. 
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Table 3: change of the gini coefficient of income inequality before/after tax and ‘tax and rebate’ (T&R) 
schemes; Suits index for the CO2 taxes.  
  Suits 
index 
Difference of 20/80 income ratio after policy   
    Unscaled  Scaled    Scaling 
factor 
 
Tax  Tax 
T&R 
adult 
T&R 0.5 
child 
Tax 
T&R 
adult 
T&R 0.5 
child   
total  -0.08  1.20  -0.54  -0.64  1.20  -0.54  -0.64  1.0 
indirect  -0.06  0.48  -0.35  -0.41  0.91  -0.66  -0.77  1.9 
home energy  -0.19  0.39  -0.01  -0.04  1.55  -0.05  -0.16  4.0 
transport  0.02  0.08  -0.24  -0.26  0.38  -1.10  -1.21  4.6 
motor fuels  -0.01  0.06  -0.12  -0.13  0.48  -1.01  -1.12  8.5 
public 
transport 
0.04  0.01  -0.05  -0.05  0.33  -1.13  -1.25 
22.7 
flights  0.07  0.01  -0.07  -0.08  0.23  -1.26  -1.36  17.9 
Note: The Suits index compares the distribution of income to the distribution of the tax burden over 
equivalised income deciles. A negative sign means the tax is regressive, a positive sign means it is progressive, 
0 is neutral. It reaches from 1 to -1. 
Changes in income inequality in response to mitigation policies are examined by comparing the ratio of mean 
income of the highest income quintile to that of the lowest income quintile after deducting tax burdens or net 
rebates from equivalised household income. Positive figures indicate an increase in income inequality, 
negative figures a decrease. The scaled 20/80 income ratio changes are multiplied by a factor reflecting the 
proportion of an emissions sub-category of total emissions. For example, home energy emissions make up 
about 25% of total emissions. The income ratio difference is thus multiplied by 4 to make it comparable to the 
one for total emissions.  
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Table 4: Comparison of mean net annual rebates of a £100 per tonne of CO2 adult-only scheme, £ pounds 
 
total 
se 
he 
se 
transpor
t  se 
mf 
se 
flight
s  se 
pt 
se 
adult 1  -49.3  10.3  -95.1  3.7  54.3  3.3  31.2  2.1  16.3  1.5  6.8  1.6 
adult 2  -140.2  16.7  -7.1  4.4  -51.2  5.5  -22.1  3.1  -19.2  2.9  -9.9  2.4 
adult 3  442.8  35.3  189.1  9.6  32.9 
13.
3  -3.4  9.1  23.8  6.9  12.4  5.4 
children  -305.0  22.7  -36.7  5.9  -69.8  7.6  -49.0  4.4  -13.9  4.2  -6.8  3.2 
no children  126.1  12.3  15.2  3.7  28.8  4.0  20.3  2.5  5.7  2.0  2.8  1.7 
age <35  55.9  22.0  80.2  6.0  -22.1  8.2  2.4  4.9  -15.5  4.2  -9.1  3.5 
age 35-65  -169.5  16.7  -9.1  4.4  -64.1  5.5  -40.3  3.4  -14.6  2.8  -9.2  2.3 
age > 65  314.0  16.5  -42.2  5.8  152.0  3.9  83.0  2.4  42.6  2.0  26.4  1.8 
low income  487.2  14.8  21.4  5.7  180.2  4.2  92.8  2.8  51.7  2.3  35.7  1.4 
high income  -807.6  23.8  -68.1  6.8  -269.7  8.5  -111.3  5.3  -92.1  5.1  -66.4  4.4 
high edu  -475.2  29.3  -15.5  7.7  -183.6  9.5  -65.9  5.7  -77.8  5.4  -39.9  4.5 
low edu  219.6  13.3  5.9  4.1  83.3  4.2  34.6  2.7  32.6  1.9  16.1  1.8 
rural  -302.7  25.1 
-
100.5 
9.1  -65.3  7.9 
-79.3  5.2  5.8  3.7  8.2  3.0 
urban  92.7  13.7  33.5  3.3  17.9  4.5  23.6  2.5  -3.2  2.4  -2.4  1.9 
workless  442.7  21.9  37.5  7.6  158.5  6.4  93.7  3.8  41.0  3.5  23.8  2.6 
in 
employmen
t 
-62.7  12.7  -5.3  3.6  -22.5  4.1 
-13.3  2.5  -5.8  2.2  -3.4  1.8 
female  51.1  13.9  -26.7  4.5  46.8  4.7  32.3  2.8  14.2  2.3  0.3  2.1 
male  -32.1  15.9  16.8  4.2  -29.4  5.0  -20.3  3.1  -9.0  2.7  -0.2  2.1 
"white"  -32.5  12.4  -7.1  3.5  -2.3  4.0  -5.2  2.4  3.7  2.0  -0.7  1.6 
ethnic 
minority 
382.3  38.5  83.9 
11.
4 
27.8 
13.
7  62.9  8.4  -43.5  7.9  8.4  5.2 
poor rural 
motorists 
113.7  46.6 
-
110.3 
22.
7 
79.5 
14.
3  -12.7  9.7  53.4  7.0  38.8  6.8 
rich rural 
motorists  -1172.4  52.3 
-
194.4 
18.
4  -347.3 
17.
0  -220.5 
11.
2  -75.6  8.9 
-
51.2  8.3 
Note: Figures in bold are significantly different to the comparator group (always the first line within each group) 
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Table 5: Percentage of households ‘losing’ from an adult only tax and rebate scheme 
  
Total  Energy  Trans-
port 
Motor 
fuel 
Flights  Public 
transport 
n 
Average  41.87  44.71  37.34  38.81  26.06  24.45  24,446 
Low income  21.1  42.5  15.2  18.7  10.3  15.5  6,112 
High income  70.7  50.2  64.7  57.3  44.0  39.6  6,112 
Children in hh  54.4  49.2  44.4  48.7  26.5  28.5  7,151 
No children hh  36.7  42.9  34.4  34.7  23.6  25.1  17,295 
Age <= 35  43.6  34.4  41.8  40.2  27.9  30.4  4,836 
Age 36 to 64  48.9  46.1  44.8  46.9  28.5  28.4  13,294 
Age>=65  25.8  49.7  18.2  20.8  13.4  17.7  6,316 
Education>=16  58.9  44.4  57.0  51.3  40.8  35.5  5,743 
Education<11  33.3  44.7  28.1  31.9  16.6  21.8  9,405 
Rural area  50.1  51.2  44.8  51.5  23.4  23.3  4,713 
Urban area  39.2  42.6  35.3  35.0  25.0  26.9  17,374 
Workless hh  24.1  40.3  18.7  20.7  12.6  19.4  3,035 
In employment  44.4  45.3  40.0  41.4  26.1  27.0  21,411 
Female head  40.5  50.4  31.5  32.4  20.8  25.7  9,434 
Male head  42.7  41.1  41.0  42.8  26.7  26.3  15,011 
Not white  34.4  36.7  36.1  29.4  35.2  28.0  1,908 
White  42.5  45.4  37.4  39.6  23.5  25.9  22,530 
Poor rural motorists  36.6  50.8  29.2  42.7  10.7  13.6  637 
Rich rural motorists  76.6  58.0  71.6  70.6  41.6  34.6  1,422 
Note: Low income households have equivalised household income equal or below the 25
th percentile, high 
income households are situated at or above the 75
th percentile of the equivalised income distribution. 
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Table 6: OLS regression results of an adult-only £100 per tonne of CO2 Tax and Rebate scheme 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Total  Home 
energy 
Transport  Total  Home 
energy 
Transport  Total  Home 
energy 
                 
Income  -
0.327*** 
-0.032***  -0.102***  -
0.246*** 
-0.020***  -0.075***  -
0.230*** 
-0.016*** 
  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
adult2  0.629***  0.177***  0.103***  0.780***  0.210***  0.150***  0.784***  0.215*** 
  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
adult3  0.663***  0.163***  0.127***  0.737***  0.200***  0.135***  0.695***  0.186*** 
  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.008) 
adult4  0.584***  0.198***  0.049*  0.626***  0.219***  0.056**  0.606***  0.210*** 
  (0.060)  (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.058)  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.057)  (0.017) 
adult5+  0.619***  0.082  0.116*  0.594***  0.109*  0.101  0.557***  0.098* 
  (0.188)  (0.056)  (0.065)  (0.182)  (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.181)  (0.055) 
child1  -
0.151*** 
-0.020***  -0.009  -
0.113*** 
-0.041***  0.026***  -
0.124*** 
-0.044*** 
  (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.006) 
child2  -
0.207*** 
-0.054***  -0.039***  -
0.142*** 
-0.029***  -0.024**  -
0.136*** 
-0.028*** 
  (0.025)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.008) 
child3+  -0.038  -0.052***  0.025  -0.049  -0.040***  0.016  -0.080**  -0.049*** 
  (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.033)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.033)  (0.012) 
age        -
0.026*** 
-0.006***  -0.008***  -
0.021*** 
-0.005*** 
        (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
age2_100        0.024***  0.004***  0.009***  0.021***  0.003*** 
        (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
agetop        -0.004  -0.016*  -0.002  0.011  -0.015* 
        (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.009) 
Female        -
0.037*** 
-0.015***  0.002  -
0.046*** 
-0.017*** 
        (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
Education 
16+ 
      -
0.201*** 
-0.025***  -0.060***  -
0.174*** 
-0.019*** 
        (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.006) 
Education 
12-15 
      -
0.122*** 
-0.022***  -0.023***  -
0.097*** 
-0.015*** 
        (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.005) 
Edu missing        0.048***  0.006  0.019***  0.050***  0.006 
        (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.007) 
Workless        0.062***  0.012*  0.030***  0.042**  0.005 
        (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.006) 
Ethnic 
minority 
      0.144***  -0.005  -0.020*  0.120***  -0.016* 
        (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.008) 
Rural        -
0.110*** 
-0.036***  -0.032***  -
0.060*** 
-0.005 
        (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.005) 
Rural 
missing 
      -
0.299*** 
-0.153***  -0.015*  -
0.103*** 
-0.032** 
        (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.035)  (0.015) 
Bedrooms        -
0.182*** 
-0.078***  -0.023***  -
0.130*** 
-0.053*** 
        (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
No vehicle        0.385***  0.046***  0.149***  0.323***  0.021*** 28 
 
        (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.005) 
Own 
outright 
            -
0.137*** 
-0.047*** 
              (0.016)  (0.006) 
Mortgage              -
0.176*** 
-0.047*** 
              (0.016)  (0.006) 
Missing own              -0.096**  -0.067*** 
              (0.042)  (0.016) 
Detached              -
0.166*** 
-0.095*** 
              (0.023)  (0.008) 
Semid              0.001  -0.045*** 
              (0.018)  (0.006) 
Terraced              0.055***  -0.027*** 
              (0.017)  (0.006) 
Flat conv.              -0.062**  -0.026*** 
              (0.031)  (0.010) 
Elec heat              0.168***  0.064*** 
              (0.017)  (0.006) 
Oil heat              -
0.233*** 
-0.147*** 
              (0.036)  (0.016) 
Other heat              0.182***  0.048*** 
              (0.020)  (0.008) 
Constant  0.507***  -0.027***  0.215***  1.291***  0.364***  0.293***  1.072***  0.300*** 
  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.061)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.061)  (0.021) 
                 
Observations  22,990  22,990  22,990  22,990  22,990  22,990  22,990  22,990 
R-squared  0.325  0.138  0.188  0.409  0.233  0.240  0.426  0.261 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1
st and 99
th percentiles of the net 
rebate distributions and of income are excluded to reduce influence of outliers. Error terms are not perfectly 
normally distributed but regression results were robust against exclusion of error outliers with no significant 
differences of coefficients. The results presented include regression outliers. 
Independent variables: “Income” represents annual disposable income divided by 10,000. “Adult2” identifies 
households with at least 2 adults, “adults3” identifies households with at least 3 adults and so forth, the same 
logic applies to the variables “child2” and following. “Age” provides age in years. Since the relationship 
between age and emissions has an inverse u-shape, an age-squared term is also used (‘age2/100 – age squared 
divided by 100). “Agetop” is  coded 1 for households with reference persons aged 80 and over and 0 otherwise. 
“Education 16+” is coded 1 if at least one household member attended full time education for 16 or more 
years. “Education 12-15” is coded 1 if at least one household member attended education for 12 to 15 years 
and 0 otherwise, “Edu missing” is coded 1 if information on education is missing. “Rural” is coded 1 for 
households in settlements with less than 10,000 inhabitants. “Rural missing” is coded 1 if information on rural 
location is missing which is mainly for households in Northern Ireland. Own outright means that the household 
owns the property without mortgage, “mortgage” means the property is owned through a mortgage. “Missing 
own” denotes that information is not available, control household is renting the property. Control household 
for type of dwelling is a household in a purpose build flat and the control household for the heating variables 
has central gas heating. 
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